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Telecommunications Privatization in Mexico
by Kevin R. Hanson
On December 20, 1990 the government of Mexico
sold it's majority holding in Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex),

modernization. The sale of Telmex represents the culmination of both of these transitions.

the nation's monopoly telephone company. A consortium of a
Mexican coalition, Grupo Carso, and telecom giants
Southwestern Bell and France Telcom paid a total of US$1.76

LIBERAL ECONOMIC TRANSITION

According to the theory of hegemonic stability,

billion for majority ownership and operating control, or 20,4

order is established by a single dominant power, or hegemon.

percent of preferred stock. The remaining 30.6 percent was

This hegemon imposes its economic and political vision on

sold in tranches to various groups, including employees, for

the world (Keohane 1984, 31; see also Gilpin, 1981). After

another US$4,4 billion. The total sale, to date, has amassed

World War II, the United States was the world hegemon.

over US$6 billion dollars for the Mexican treasury. This sale

Uncontested economically and politically, the U.S. set out to

is widely regarded as "one of the greatest success stories of

transform the world into a liberal/democratic reflection of

the privatization revolution" (Galal et al 1994, 417). As such,

itself The rise of the Soviet Union limited U.S. dominance

it merits closer examination. However, in order to understand

somewhat, but only in the sense of breadth; within its

what made this sale such a success, it is first necessary to

domain, the U.S. was still the hegemon.

examine the larger forces which brought it about.
The privatization revolution can be traced to the

Within the realm of political economy, Keohane
argues hegemony is based on economic dominance. He states

convergence of two global transitions which had significant

that "hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials,

impact on the developing world. The first transition is the

control over sources of capital, control over markets, and com-

larger economic and political transitions which have swept

petitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods"

the globe since the early 1980s. Some of these transitions

(Keohane 1984, 32). Since the mid 1960s, the US has had

have received a great deal of attention: the fall of the Berlin

less control over these four determinants of hegemonic power.

Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of the

As American dominance has lessened, so has its dominance of

Soviet Union, for example. Elements of this transition

the world. While Keohane goes on to argue (indeed it is the

receiving less attention, but which are no less significant,

central point of his book) that a hegemon is not necessary for

include the adoption of democracy and more liberal econom-

global stability; however, a hegemon's decline is inherently felt

ic policies in much of Southern Europe, Latin America, and

throughout its sphere of influence.

Asia. Howard Wiarda calls these transitions the "quiet revo-

Signs of declining hegemony can be seen as early as

lution" (1995, vii). Second, Petrazzini argues that "among

the mid- I 960s. Comparative advantage was the first area of

the public services and state industries that are being

dominance to decline. The economic climate solidified after

restructured in most developing nations, one has emerged as

World War II was "an economic arrangement that depended

the spearhead and show case of a broader reform program:

on a productivity pact among the welfare state, the corporate

the telecommunications sector" (1995, I). The privatiza-

sector, and labor unions in which production and productivity

tion of Telmex is the direct result of these larger transitions.

expanded to the benefit of all parties involved ....With a bal-

First, Mexico's experience with liberal economic and democ-

ance between expanding mass production and mass consump-

ratic transition led to the privatization of nationalized

tion, unemployment remained below 4 percent, and the gross

industries. Furthermore, the telecommunications industry

national product (GNP) grew at a rate of 5 percent annually"

experienced a parallel transition toward competition and

(Otero 1996, 4). A crisis of productivity emerged as other
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industrialized nations began to rival the levels of productivity

resource. This position of power allowed these creditors to

once achieved only in the United States.

exercise significant control over the terms of credit extension.

This challenge to American dominance in compara-

Judith Teichman makes this point when discussing the IMF's

tive advantage did not result in an initial change in U.S. com-

impact in Latin America. She argues that "when l Latin

mitment to liberal economic policies. However, when com-

America's J only resource was the IMF, the resultant reschedul-

bined with the oil crisis of 1973, this commitment began to

ings and new loans overseen by that organization entailed a

weaken. The oil crisis provides an excellent example of the

variety of economic policy conditions. These conditions,

decline of American dominance over raw materials. The well-

which reflected current economic thinking, strongly encour-

documented OPEC embargo placed, for the first time, serious

aged, if they did not dictate, policies conducive to economic

constraints on American access ro essential production materi-

liberalization" (1995,6). The goal of reducing state interven-

als. Dependence on foreign oil forced U.S. firms to pay dra-

tion and returning to a reliance on market forces brought

matically inflated rates, which in turn led to an increase in

pressure on indebted LDCs to privatize and deregulate

production costs. Because all other industrialized western

national industries.

nations were also affected, a period of intensified international

A widely held perception of inefficient nationalized

competition ensued. The United States, "strongly supportive

industries fueled the privatization movement. Teichman claims

of expanded trade relations prior to 1970, now became

that "the trade restricting import-substitution industrializa-

increasingly protectionist, and the liberal trading environment

tion policies .... were seen as responsible for the decline in

of the pre- 1 970 period began to wane" (Teichman 1995, 5).

economic activity in

The oil crisis had the additional effect of lessening

lLatin America 1 and,

it was argued,

should therefore be replaced by freer economic policies."

U.S. control over sources of capital. The dramatic increase in

(Teichman 1995, 7). As the magnitude of the crisis became

OPEC profits flooded the capital market with "petrodollars."

apparent during the mid- 1 980s, both IMF and World Bank

Commercial banks aggressively sought borrowers. Less devel-

policies reflected this belief Indeed, third world debtors were

oped countries (LDCs) were prime targets because they seek-

required to follow policies of state reduction and increased

ing to expand their economies through import substitution

reliance on the private sector.

industrialization models or to take advantage of inflated oil

As these policies were implemented, both agencies

prices by increasing their own production (Teichman 1995,

seemed to be initially pleased with the privatization of peripheral

6). Combined with increasing costs, additional debt became a

organizations, while allowing core companies to remain in state

burden too heavy for LDCs to bear when interest rates rose

hands. However, the Brady Plan, "announced by U.S. Treasury

dramatically in 1981. The increase in balance of payments

Secretary Nicolas Brady in March 1989, went considerably fur-

brought on the now infamous debt crisis of the 19 80s

ther, pledging to grant debt relief to countries that implemented

(Haggard and Kaufman 1995,285).

market-oriented reform to promote growth. Striking a deal

The decline of American hegemony during the

involved privatization of core sectors" (Teichman 1995, 8).

1 960s and 1 970s contributed to the transformation of the

Noted privatization expert Ramamurti attributes the aggressive

global economic environment in the 1980s. For Latin

drives toward privatization after 1989 in Argentina, Mexico, and

America, and most of the developing world, it also con-

Venezuela to the Brady Plan (1996,82).

tributed to a dramatic debt crisis. It is this crisis that ulti-

This dramatic change in economic emphasis can be

mately brought about the onset of their economic transforma-

attributed to diminished comparative advantage and the oil

tion. As LDC ability to repay commercial loans diminished

crisis of the 1970s and their impact on U.S. hegemony rela-

and many approached default, international institutions such

tive to Keohane's definition. While these are limited examples

as the IMF and the World Bank became the last available

of an extremely large phenomenon, they demonstrate the

6

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

decline of American dominance and that the effects of the

times resulted in the destablization of many authoritarian

ensuing transformation were felt throughout the developing

regimes in Latin American, that were ultimately replaced by

world, particularly in Latin America. Furthermore, these exam-

more democratic governments.

ples demonstrate that the Latin American economic crisis of
the 1980s can be attributed to the decline in U.S. hegemony.

LIBERAL/DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MEXICO

The liberal/democratic transition in Mexico is an
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The Latin American economic crisis of the 1980s, in

important example of such revolutions. Although Mexico
shares many similarities with the overall liberal economic and

turn, lead to an equally dramatic political upheaval. Wiarda

political transition experienced throughout the developing

points out that there has been a miraculous transformation in

world, and especially within Latin America, its distinct politi-

Latin America. In 1977, fourteen of twenty countries in this

cal apparatus requires closer examination. Unlike many

hemisphere had authoritarian governments. As of 1995, nine-

nations in the region, Mexico was not under military, authori-

teen now have "more or less" democratic governments

tarian, or communist rule prior to the debt crisis of 1981.

(Wiarda 1995, vii). Haggard and Kaufman argue that both

Mexico has had democratic rule since its revolution in 1920;

political and economic causes must be examined simultane-

however, the dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary

ously (1995,4). In other words, a political economy of

Party (PRI) can only be described as "democratic-authoritari-

democratic transition must be established.

anism." Democratic institutions exist (IE political parties and

Haggard and Kaufman's argument of a political
economy of democratic transition is based on three key
premises: first, the socio-economic structure of a nation

elections) but are severely limited by PRI dominance (Otero
1996, 10; see also Teichman, 1995).
Such dominant party systems, while equally affected

directly impacts political alignments; second, the economic

by crises, respond differently. Haggard and Kaufman explain

performance of the political regime impacts satisfaction

that "the most distinctive feature of dominant-party regimes ..

among key support groups; and third, political/economic

.. is their political resiliency in the face of both economic

interests are inseparable from socio-political institutions.

downturns and periods of growth. Because they possess

This is crucial to understanding their argument that failure by

greater political resources for the management of political

the existing regime to react in a timely and adequate way to

conflict, they are more likely to persist through economic cri-

economic crises leads directly to the destablization, and ulti-

sis" (1995, 13). Two reasons why they are able to maintain

mately, the replacement of their government (Haggard and

power are, first, such a system provides the necessary indepen-

Kaufman 1995,6-7). Therefore, given the tumultuous nature

dence to initiate unpopular measures, and, second, it provides

of the economic crisis facing the developing world, it is not

means for building organized support mechanisms (Haggard

surprising that many of the governments in power suffered a

and Kaufman 1995,284). Due to the PRJ's ability to consol-

loss of support and were ultimately replaced.

idate power and organize support, it was not replaced as were

In summary, through the larger theories of Keohane
and Haggard and Kaufman, it can be seen that the political
economy of Latin America has been dramatically altered since

other Latin governments. However, significant economic and
political change resulted from this crisis.
Ironically, it is the nature of Mexico's dominant-party

the late 1960s. The decline in U.S. hegemony contributed to

system which exacerbated its economic crisis and resulted in

the changed economic environment and to an unsustainable

lost political power. A crisis of legitimacy surfaced with the

level of debt. The ensuing balance-of-payments crisis, in turn,

unusually brutal suppression of the Tlatleloco Square student

led to a broader economic crisis when coupled with dramatic

rebellion in Mexico City in 1968. The reconciliatory attempts

increases in interest rates in 1981. These difficult economic

of successive presidents Echeverria and Lopez Portillo ulti-
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mately led to a deepening of the impending economic crisis.

the U.S. and Canada, a step widely seen as both confirming

These successive presidents initiated, among other reactions,

and consolidating the enacted measures.

rural land reform, a dramatic increase in government spending

In spite of the successful reaction to economic crisis,

on health and education, nationalization of the banking indus-

there was some political fallout. In conformity with Haggard

try (1982), and a substantial increase in public investment and

and Kaufman's overriding theory of democratization, the PRI

in the size of the public enterprise sector (Haggard and

did suffer a considerable loss of political dominance. However,

Kaufman 1995,284; see also Teichman, 1995).

their dominant-party control did allow the government to

In an attempt to lessen reliance on external debt to

remain in office where there might otherwise have been a transi-

fund these programs, the PRI proposed tax reforms in the

tion similar to those seen throughout much of Latin America.

early 1970s. However, the powerful, rightist private sector

Perhaps the most visible demonstration of this decrease in

successfully blocked the effort, forcing the government to rely

power was the growth of opposition parties, especially the

on foreign borrowing and an inflation tax. Several scholars

National Action Party (PAN). For the first time since the revo-

have pointed out that "this road led directly to high deficits,

lution, a party other than the PRI won a governorship and was

inflation, and a balance-of-payments crisis in 1975 -76 .... by

allowed to take office (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 302).

the end of the decade, the economy was highly vulnerable to

PAN won three governorships in rural states between 1988 and

the external shocks that hit all of the developing world: the

1992. Furthermore, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the son of the pop-

sharp rise in interest rates, the collapse of commercial lending,

ular president Lazaro Cardenas, waged a substantial challenge to

and for oil producers, the sharp fall of oil prices" (Haggard

the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in the 1988 presi-

and Kaufman 1995,285). External shocks did hit Mexico,

dential elections. Salinas won only 50.7 percent of the popular

and the PRI faced a significant economic and political crisis.

vote, the lowest total in PRI history (See Appendix 2), even

Three features of the dominant-party regime allowed
the PRI to react effectively to this crisis. First, flexibility associated with the powerful presidency allowed for strong, and

with the benefit of gross electoral fraud (Haggard and Kaufman
1995,302: Teichman 1995, 175).
This political crisis forced two reactions from the

timely, reaction. Second, the core of technocrats within the

PRI and Salinas. First, the creation of PRONASOL

Bank of Mexico and the Finance Ministry facilitated movement

(National Solidarity), an organization designed to link the

toward neo-liberal reform. Third, corporatist control over

government to the urban and rural poor. Local committees

unions allowed control of wage restraint, plant closing, and

were created which joined with regional representatives

privatization (Haggard and Kaufman 1995,286-7). These fac-

appointed by the president to create and fund local develop-

tors allowed the external debt to be rescheduled and thereby

ment projects. The goal was to offset some of the political

reduced nearly in half between 1982 and 1985 (See Appendix

pressure caused by the unequal distribution of wealth and

1). It also allowed President de la Madrid to normalize tense

resources throughout the nation. PRONASOL had the added

relations with the IMF in 1985 -6 and enter GATT negotia-

advantage of serving as a political counterweight to the old-

tions in 1987. The following year, trade liberalization contin-

guard politicians within the PRI who were not supportive of

ued to increase with the virtual elimination of quantitative

some of the reform measures (Haggard and Kaufman 1995,

restrictions and the dramatic reduction of the average tarifE As

300). Second, constitutional amendments were passed in

the de la Madrid presidency came to a close, the heavy inflation

1990 and 1993 which created new opportunities for opposi-

of the 1 980s was brought into check, reduced from highs of

tion parties to gain representatives in the legislature and at

160 percent in 1987 to under 30 percent in 1988 (Otero

state and local levels. These amendments reduced the ability

1996, 9). The crowning accomplishment of this recovery was

of the PRI to dominate and manipulate the electoral process,

the 1989 admission of Mexico into NAFTA negotiations with

a mainstay of its political control. Perhaps the most signifi-

8
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cant aspect of these amendments is that they were passed with
support of PAN (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 300).
Political changes clearly took place in Mexico as a

Building on the success of these larger sales, the
government undertook a more ambitious second stage of privatization during 1985 and 1986. While the pace of divesti-

result of the economic crisis in the developing world. The

ture was increased, the policy of affecting only non-core

after shocks of the American decline were felt strongly from

industries remained in place. Over eighty-two companies were

the mid 1970s until the late 19805. However, the nature of

either sold, liquidated, or transferred. These companies were

the Mexico's dominant-party democracy provided a resiliency

in non-core areas of domestic products such as paper, cement,

that mitigated the type of political transition seen in other

auto parts, secondary petrochemicals industries, electro-

Latin American nations.

mechanical products, and mining metallurgy. By the end of the
de la Madrid administration in 1986, 706 companies had

PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO

In spite of the resiliency of Mexico's dominant-party
democracy in the face of economic and political crisis, there
were significant changes in long-held policies. One of the

been divested (Teichman 1995, 1 35). Furthermore, this stage
of privatization demonstrated a serious, long-term commitment to liberal economic reform.
The third and fourth stages of privatization, however,

most scrutinized policies was the prevalence of nationalized

marked an ambitious divergence from the previous two. Stages

industries. As a debtor nation reliant on international credit

one and two were politically cautious, always careful to avoid an

institutions, Mexico came under increasing pressure to priva-

industry or company that might be sensitive to national pride,

tize their huge number of state-owned companies (Waterbury

union dominance, or public services. Beginning in stage three,

1990, 31 3) (See Appendix 3).

these more sensitive firms were longer avoided. The opening of

Movement toward privatization began in 1982 under

this stage was marked by the 1986 closure of Fundidora

President de la Madrid. While there was considerable resis-

Monterrey, the nation's largest steel mill. This era ended in late

tance from many sectors of both state enterprises and govern-

J 989 with the decision of the Salinas administration to priva-

ment. the pace of divestiture increased as government control

tize all state enterprises in areas not specifically mentioned in

was consolidated under the successive presidencies of de la

the constitution as 'strategic' (Teichman 1995, 13 2).

Madrid and Salinas. Part of the necessary political consolida-

With the continued political consolidation of the

tion was achieved by a prudent approach to divestiture. Due

Salinas administration, the fourth stage took on the most dif-

to the delicate nature of privatization, only non-core indus-

ficult battles. In late 1989, "the economic cabinet agreed to

tries were initially sold, closed, or reorganized. President de la

divest of all public enterprises in sectors not specifically

Madrid announced in early 1982 "that while state ownership

named in the Constitution .... That is, the state would Ionly 1

was 'under review,' the state would withdraw only from 'small

retain PEMEX (petroleum), CFE (electrical energy), FER-

and medium enterprises Iwith 1scarce influence' on the behav-

RONALES (railways), and the Central Bank, along with agen-

ior of productive branches" (Teichman 1995, 131). In this

cies involved in mail delivery, radio telegraph, and communica-

first phase of privatization, the pace was slow and methodical.

tions via satellite" (Teichman 1989, J 36). The first and

However in 1983 and 1984, the pace quickened. Over one

largest victory in the fourth stage was the sale of the national

hundred state companies were shed. The companies sold were

telephone company, Telmex (Galal et al. 1994,4 I 7).

rarely of a nature that would cause public discomfort. Paper

The privatization of Telmex was the crowning

companies and food processing firms, for example, were sold

accomplishment of the economic and political transitions that

without widespread consternation. The most important sales

swept Mexico. It was not undertaken quickly or without prece-

during this phase were of the automotive companies Renault

dent. Rather, this $6.2 billion sale represents a serious com-

of Mexico and Vehiculos Automotores Mexicanos.

mitment to liberal economic poliCles. The transition from a
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closed- to an open-market economy did not come quickly or

users is that CCMs traditionally keep local usage prices low,

easily. The decline of the United States economic hegemony

mostly for political reasons; unfortunately, this in not the case

created a sever crisis that caused both political and economic

with long-distance or international rates.

realignment. It is this realignment that brought about the policy of privatization and that led to the sale of Telmex.

Politics is involved on another level in the Cash
Cow Model. The CCM's "most striking characteristic is that
service suppliers are not allowed to retain and reinvest the

THEORY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRIVATIZATION

Like the world of political economy, the world of

bulk of their profits. The national treasury views telecommunications as a cash cow that is milked for funds to invest

telecommunications underwent a dramatic transformation. Just

elsewhere" (Cowhey and Aronson 1989, 8; see also

as the developing world was forced to reexamine its commit-

Straubhaar, 1995). Ramamurti states that in Mexico, the

ment to nationalized industries, so to was the telecom arrange-

government received up to 42 percent of annual profits dur-

ment in most LDCs brought under scrutiny by the changed

ing the 1980s (1996,73). Many developing countries see

global climate. Therefore, in order to understand the impor-

this advantage and rely heavily on the Cash Cow Model.

tance of the Telmex privatization, some exposure to the theoret-

However, the pressures of this dynamic industry make a

ical premises of telecommunications privatization is necessary.

CCM difficult to maintain over time. These pressures push

Peter Cowhey is perhaps the leading scholar on te/ecom in Latin America. He argues that there are six basic models of telecommunications organization: Scarcity, Cash Cow,

LDCs to consider Cowhey's next level of organization, the
Monopoly Modernization Model (MMM).
As the name suggests, an MMM is not an attempt to

Monopoly Modernization, Boutique, Full Competition, and

privatize, or dramatically change, the existing system. Rather

Global Communications. Each is characterized by respectively

it is an attempt to modernize the state-dominated system in

declining levels of government involvement coupled with

such a way as to promote additional services, provide uniform

increasing market control and private ownership (Cowhey and

technologies, and encourage national development. A key

Aronson 1989, 36). Cash Cow, Monopoly Modernization,

ingredient is an emphasis on national development through

and Boutique models will be examined as they are most applic-

telecommunications. Eventually, "governments and their lead-

able to this discussion.

ers come to view telecommunications more as a means to pro-

Until 1990, Mexico operated under a Cash Cow

mote development and modernization lmore so 1 than as a

Model (CCM). In a CCM, the government owns and operates

captive cash cow.... Countries shifting toward MMM recog-

the entire, or the vast majority, of the telecommunications

nize that communications services are far too important to

system. Domestic and international services are often separat-

permit the old system to continue" (Cowhey and Aronson

ed into distinct companies, each owned by the state. Services

1989, 1 I). Like the CCM, the MMM has a natural life span.

are usually limited. Beyond favoring elite industries, govern-

Monopolies cannot keep pace in a competitive global market

ment, and the military, urban customers are given priority over

place over time.

rural or remote users. The rational given is basic economics;

Once again, pressure pushes the developing nation to

extending lines to rural and remote locations requires large

the next level of organization: the Boutique Model (BM). The

capital outlays with proportionally little return. Whereas,

underlying premise of this model is that as telecom services

expanding urban services requires significantly less overhead

become increasingly specialized, increasingly specialized

with a comparably tremendous return via economies of scale.

providers are required. The main difference between Monopoly

Therefore, "to the extent that it is politically feasible, most

Modernization and the Boutique Model is the presumption of

carriers try to reallocate their investments to more profitable

competition. In an MMM, the existence of competition is a

lsectors r

bargained exception to the normal operation of the system. In

(Cowhey and Aronson 1989, 8). One advantage to

10
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a BM environment, "the issue is not whether there should be
competition, but how much and in which market segments"

TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO

As part of the fourth stage of privatization under

(Cowhey and Aronson ]989, 15). Furthermore, competition is

Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas, it was announced in

viewed within the BM as a vehicle to promote innovation and

September of ] 989 that Telmex would be sold. Telmex had

modernization. The injection of competitors and market forces

been the monopoly supplier of all telecommunications in

is intended to transform telecom companies into efficient

Mexico since its establishment in 1948. It was created from a

competitors able to adapt to customer and industry demands.

merger of two existing companies, both foreign owned:

Competition is seen as a means of transforming suppliers into

Telefonos Ericsson, a subsidiary of L.M. Ericsson of Sweden,

efficient entities. Unfortunately,

and Compania Telefonica Meixicana, a subsidiary of ITT of

"J

government cannot guaran-

tee success simply by instructing the monopoly telephone com-

the United States. The Mexican government became the

pany to change its ways. Transforming the dominant telephone

majority shareholder of Telmex in ] 958, and gained control of

company [requires 1 greater competition" (Cowhey and

51 percent of corporate equity in 1972, thereby assuming

Aronson 1989, 15).

control of the company and nationalizing it. The remaining

Foreign corporations are generally the principle

49 percent remained in private control and continued to trade

source of competition. Foreign expertise, experience, and

on both the Mexican stock exchange and the NASDAQ net-

money are integral parts of the Boutique Model. Indeed, often

work (Perez de Mendoza 1989,91).

when desired services are not available through domestic

Given the preceding discussion, it may seem obvious

providers, foreign firms are relied upon to fill the gap.

why Telmex would be privatized. However, Ramamurti argues

(Cowhey and Aronson 1989, 36). Perhaps the greatest asset

that it may not have been a natural target for the government

of a BM over the previous two models is a greater prevalence

auction block. By Latin American standards, Telmex was one

of investment funds. A BM encourages telecoms to reinvest

of the most productive, well run telecoms. Because of private

profits in the expansion of the national and international net-

roots and continued partial private ownership, it had a tradi-

work of services. Competition demands that all companies

tion of business-like behavior and strong accountability to

involved reinvest or suffer the consequences of becoming

share-holders. During the period of state ownership, "Telmex

un competitive (Cowhey and Aronson] 989, 36; Straubhaar,

was always profitable and always paid dividends. From 1985

1995). A last important note on the boutique model is that

to 1989, return on sales averaged 23.6 percent and return on

there are several distinct levels of competition before reaching

equity 12.8 percent. The government's pricing policies were,

an environment of full competition. The extent to which the

in fact, designed to yield a 12 percent return on capital"

state is involved in local and long-distance telephone service

(Ramamurti 1996, 75). Also, as mentioned above, it supplied

can range from limited private ownership of the state-domi-

substantial revenues to the national treasury. Therefore, it is

nated provider to complete privatization. The entire range

not unreasonable to ask, why privatize?

falls under this model. This model is as far as most LDCs will

The reasons for privatization are many. First, Telmex

go in the foreseeable future, therefore the Full Competition

suffered from the inherent ills of the Cash Cow Model. Profits

and Global Competition models will not be discussed.

were not reinvested and expansion was weak. Although Mexico

The ground work is now complete. Macro issues of

had comparable service to both Korea and Spain in ] 965, these

global and Mexican liberal/democratic transition, privatization

nations have experienced considerable expansion to roughly 30

in Mexico, and the theory behind telecommunications privati-

lines per 100 people. Mexico, on the other hand, has floun-

zation have all been discussed. These discussions provide the

dered by comparison and remains at under 10 lines per 100

foundation necessary to more fully understand the privatiza-

people. In ] 989, eighteen of the thirty countries in the

tion of telecommunications in Mexico.

Western Hemisphere provided more telephone access to its cit-
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izens than Mexico (see Appendix 4). Customers traditionally

far lower than the standard of 12 percent set for the 1990s.

waited several years for telephone installation. In fact, by 1989

By 1989, "more than half the telephone tax was diverted to

over one million people were on waiting lists for service

the treasury for general expenses, so that telephone users were

(Szekely 1995, 41). Therefore, the government" argued that

financing government programs in other sectors" (Ramamurti

privatization would enable Telmex to expand faster while mod-

1996,75). It was hoped that the separation of direct govern-

ernizing its network and services" (Ramamurti 1996,78).

ment control coupled with the threat of forthcoming competi-

In an effort to show that they were serious about
improving service and expanding the network, two days after
announcing the privatization, the Secretariat of

tion would provide necessary incentive to redirect profits to
expansion and modernization.
Another strong reason to sell Telmex was the desire

Communications and Transport announced that the future

of the Salinas administration to reduce budget deficits, and

owners would be required to meet the following ambitious

maintain those levels once realized (see Appendix 1).

standards:

Privatizing Telmex helped to achieve both goals. First, to
maintain the stated goal of network expansion at a yearly pace

•

the number of lines in service were to be expanded at a

of 12 percent would require an outlay of U.S.$2-2.5 billion~

minimum rate of 12 percent per annum until 1994; by

annually. The government did not feel that it could finance

2000, telephone density was to increase to ten lines per

this level of investment, neither did it feel that the company

100 population, compared to five lines per 100 popula-

could raise those funds internally or through its own credit

tion in 1989.

(Ramamurti 1996, 78). Conveniently, one of the principle
goals of most privatization is to raise funds for the national

•

all towns with a population of 500 or more were to have

treasury (Straubhaar 1995,19). Mexico saw a significant

telephone service by the end of 1994.

opportunity to do Just that, with the additional advantage of
not increasing its debt. When Telmex was sold in December of

•

the number of public telephones was to be increased from

1990, it fetched U.S.$ 1.76 billion for the treasury alone. The

0.8 per 1,000 persons to 2 per 1,000 persons in 1994

combined revenues from the prevIous 723 privatizations only

and 5 per 1,000 in 1998.

raised U.S.$47 1.2 million. In other words, in only the initial
offering, Telmex alone raised nearly four times the revenue of

•

in towns with automatic exchanges, waiting time for a
new connection was to be six months by 1995 and one
month by 2000.

all other privatization efforts (Ramamurti 1996, 72).

It would seem, then, that the decision to privatize
was a sound one. As the privatization went forward, several
ideas which conform with Haggard and Kaufman's model of

•

the quality of service to be improved as stipulated (see

the political economy of democratic transition came into play.

Appendix 6) (Szekely 1995, 50; see also Ramamurti,

The first such idea is the consolidation of presidential power.

1996).

As the privatization effort became entrenched during the
1980s, ideology came to playa significant role. With the

Meeting these standards was a requirement to maintaining

appointment of pro-liberal-transition technocrats in strategic

monopoly status.

positions under the successive presidencies of de la Madrid

A second reason to privatize is that as a typical

and Salinas, the move in many ways became inevitable. Salinas

CCM, political pressures kept Telmex from reinvesting its

was adamant that "Mexico had to transform itself from an

profits. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, reinvestment levels

inward-looking, state-dominated, protected economy to an

only allowed for an annual network expansion of six percent,

outward-looking, privatized, open economy that would take

12
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advantage of its location next to a large, rich neighbor"

allowed up to 49 percent of a telephone service company to be

(Ramamurti 1996, 77).

owned by foreigners, and Salinas chose not to change that. All

Haggard and Kaufman were adamant that presiden-

that was necessary was to amend the stipulation in Telmex's

tial power alone was insufficient to make the changes neces-

articles of association that at least 51 percent of the compa-

sary to maintain power in times of crisis. It was essential that

ny's stock had to be owned by the state" (Ramamurti 1996,

those who benefited from the existing system be appeased.

81). The necessary changes were made at a meeting of share-

One of the principle beneficiaries under the government's

holders and constitutional wrangling was avoided.

administration of Telmex was labor. Unions naturally fear pri-

With political obstacles overcome through the

vatization because of the possibility of dramatic losses of

strength of the presidency, Telmex was sold in December of

Jobs, sharp decline in pay scales, and loss of influence. Telmex

1990 to Grupo Carso, a Mexican business consortium operat-

employees were among the best paid in the nation and their

ing in conjunction with Southwestern Bell and France TeIcom.

work force had consistently expanded by eight percent during

Galal argues that the sophistication with which this sale was

the 1980s. The Telephone Worker's Union (STRM) was very

made makes it the model for other developing countries

involved in the internal workings of the company, and exerted

(1994, 417). Therefore, a pertinent public policy question is,

a great deal of influence on decisions. Furthermore, they rec-

why was this sale so successful?

ognized that a change in ownership could destroy this rela-

Perhaps the deciding factor in the sale's success was

tionship (Ramamurti, 1996). The key in winning STRM

the care which the Mexican government took to assure that

cooperation was presidentIal power. Salinas became personally

quality investors would be attracted. Telmex "was reasonably

involved, and secured support through a "carrot-and-stick

attractive to begin with. It was fairly well run and profitable.

offer." The agreement consisted of three main points: first, a

Its future promised real growth of 12 percent per year for at

promise that no jobs would be lost once ownership changed

least five more years. It had one million people on the waiting

hands; second, employees would be allowed to buy a substan-

list for new connections. Demand for long-distance service

tial amount of shares with the support of a government-

was booming as the Mexican economy began to open up and

backed loan; third, the privatization would happen even with-

trade with the United States expanded" (Ramamurti 1996,

out their cooperation (Ramamurti 1996, 79-80). The first

83). This alone would seem to make Telmex an attractive

two concessions are not uncommon. The threat of overwhelm-

prospect; nonetheless, the government took several actions

ing the union is a direct reflection of the type of presidential

which would assure a quality transaction.

authority which makes a dominant-party system more resilient
to political transition.
Another key constituency which had to be appeased

One of the most important actions taken prior to
the sale was to rebalance local and international tariffs.
Remember that Cowhey and Aronson argue that a common

was the legislature. While in Mexico's dominant-party system

feature of a CCM is unrealistically low prices for local services

the legislature does not wield a great deal of power, it have

(1989,8). This is done by offsetting the expense through

enough to be disruptive. Therefore, the conditions of the sale

inflated international prices and is motivated by political con-

were maintained within the parameters of the Constitution.

cerns. Until 1987, Mexico had been a fairly typical example of

Telephone service is not specifically reserved to the state

a CCM, and it was reflected in pricing schemes. In 1988 local

under the Constitution as are petroleum, railroads, and bank-

service tariffs were raised "sharply." Telmex profits increased

ing. Two specific telecommunications functions are reserved to

from U.S.$206 million in 1987 to U.S.$628 million and

the state: satellites and telegraphs. Rather than get into a dif-

U.S.$450 million in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The second

ficult constitutional struggle with the legislature, Salinas

part of the rebalancing was to reduce international rates, also

opted to retain these two services. Furthermore, "the rules

done in 1988.

KEVIN

R.

HANSON

I

13

By raising rates for the part of the business that was

would delay, or even eliminate, the opening of the long-dis-

a natural monopoly (that is, local service), the gov-

tance market, especially considering the tremendous success

ernment enhanced Telmex's ability to respond to

already experienced (Dolan 1995, 12 I). However, the

competition .... in long distance service. The price of

announcement in 1994 that competition would indeed be

Telmex shares rose more steeply in the Mexican stock

allowed as planned solidified the transition to a BM. Since the

exchange in response to the tariff revision than it did

1994 announcement, eight companies have registered to enter

either when privatization was announced by Salinas

the long-distance market, collectively pledging to invest

or after control of the firm actually turned over to

U.S.55 billion by 2002 (Peterson 1996, Cl).

the new owners (Ramamurti 1996, 84).

Telmex has taken the threat of competition very seriously. Since the new ownership took control in 1990, they

This was crucial in creating a viable environment for both

have spent "over [U.S.S1 10 billion on plants and equipment,

Tclmex and its future owners, as demonstrated by the reaction

adding over 3 million new lines, digitizing 2.4 million analog

of the business world. But it was also politically crucial

lines, laying 8,400 miles of fiber-optic cable, and co-leading

because it removed a daunting task that would have been left

construction of a trans-Atlantic fiber-optic cable" (Dolan

to the incoming private firm. While this resulted in substan-

1995,121). In fact, most of the standards set by the privati-

tial short- and long-term profits for Telmex (arguably the

zation agreement have been either met or exceeded (see

largest gain in the entire process), it was perhaps more impor-

Appendices 5 and 6). In short, the goals of the privatization

tant in that it effectively removed the government from direct

have been met to date, and there is little reason to disagree

control of company earnings. This further reduced the Cash

with the authors who have labeled the Telmex sale the stan-

Cow Model environment and facilitated a movement toward a

dard for all other nations to chase (Galal et al. 1994,417).

Monopoly Modernization Model.
This movement was written into the privatization
agreement as another effort to make the company more attrac-

CONCLUSION

The privatization of Te1mex is a direct result of larg-

tive to investors; however, it was granted as a temporary peri-

er liberal economic and democratic transitions as experienced

od to allow for the consolidation of Telmex. Continued

in Mexico. Furthermore, when combined with the transition

monopoly power was granted until 1997. In January of that

within the telecommunications industry toward private owner-

year, Mexico was scheduled to move into the Boutique Model

ship and modernization, it is evident that this sale is the

by opening long-distance and international calls to complete

result of converging transitions. The decline of u.S. hegemo-

competition. An important difference between Mexico's tran-

ny and the ensuing debt crisis in Latin America forced the

sition to a BM compared to other developing countries is that

Mexican government to reevaluate its commitment to a closed

Telmex was not broken into competing entities. In Argentina

market and nationalized industries. Economic crisis also

local service was separated into two national companies, divid-

caused a political realignment. While the government was not

ed geographically between the north and south. In Chile local

replaced, as was the case in much of Latin America, presiden-

and long-distance services were broken into distinct compa-

tial power was consolidated and rival political parties were

nies. Telmex was allowed to remain intact in an effort to

given more accommodation. These transitions led to a dra-

attract investors (Ramamurti 1996, 85).

matic sell-off of nationalized industries. The crowning accom-

Transition into the Boutique Model has important
considerations beyond the immediate infusion of competition.
There was some doubt about the government's commitment
to allow competition. Many feared that political pressure

plishment of this process was the US$ 6 billion sale of the
national telephone company.
This huge sale also represents the parallel transition
within the tdeeom industry. Beyond the pressures of global

'4 I
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economics and national politics, the telecom industry has taken

deeper considerations. For example, with the exponentially

on increased importance in a nation's economic development.

expanding information revolution. the privatization of Telmex

Mexico could no longer afford itself the luxury of siphoning

will impact the average Mexican citizen in ways that we cannot

Telmex profits to fund more politically expedient projects. The

yet imagine. Perhaps the introduction of a privately owned,

pressures of the information era demand reinvestment of prof-

internationally competitive telecommunications company into

its and expansion of communication networks. Wisely, the

a more democratic and market oriented Mexico will prove to

Mexican government recognized the ability of the Telmex sale

be the key to long-term, substantial social and economic

to satisfy the pressures of both converging transitions.

development. Given the information era we now live in,

The convergence of these transitions is important

stranger things have happened.

within the realm of political economy; however, there are also

-APPENDIX 1 SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS

MExIco 1982-1992
Indicators
% Change in real GOP
Inflation
Change in real min. wage
Investment growth
Trade balance ($US Bil)
Federal deficits/GOP
FDI ($US Bil)
External debt/GOP

'82
-0.6
58.9
-12.6
-16.8
7
16.9
1.7
49.1

'83
-4.2
101.8
-20.1
-26.6
14.1
8.6
0.5
61

'84
3.6
65.5
-1.6
4.3
13.2
8.5
0.4

54.2

'85
2.6
57.7
-5.9
7.9
8.4
9.6
0.5
52.6

'86

'87

-3.8
86.2
-2.9
-II.8

1.7
131.8
-3.8
-0.1
8.8
15
3.2
73.6

5
14.9
1.5
76.6

'88
1.2
114.2
-15.7
5.8
2.6
10.9
2.6
59.1

Source: Teichman. 1995. Privatization and political change in Mexico. 70.
Haggard and Kaufman. 1995. The political economy of democratic transitions, 289.

-APPENDIX 2 PRJ ELECTION RESULTS, 1970-1994

Year

Candidate

Vote Share

1970
1976
1982
1988
1994

Luis Echeverria Alvarez
Jose Lopez Portillo
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon

86
100
74.3
50.7
50.2

Source:

Haggard and Kaufman. 1995. The political economy of democratic transitions. 302

'89

'90

3.3
20
6.1
6.4
0.4
5
3
48.6

4.4
26.7
-8.9
13.1
-0.9
2.8
2.6
39.8

'91
3.6
22.7
-4.7
8.1
-7.2
0.3
4.8
36.4

'92
2.8
15.5
-4.6
10.8
-15.9
-1.6
4.3
33.4
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-APPENDIX 3-

CREATION AND DIVESTITIJRE OF PUBUC ENTERPRISES

MEXICO, 1983-1993

Divestitures
Completed

Divestitures
In Progress

Divestitures
Authorized

No. of
Companies
Created

No. of
Companies
in Existence at
Year's End

"

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Source:

107

32
7
23
75
49
89
170
190
87
53

75
32
89
132
86
76
69
82
95
66
1.5

10
18

39
112
207
135
165
239
272

7
7
15
2
2
2

-

-

1058
1037
932
732
612

-

5
8

-

4

449
386
286
241
217
209

Teichman, 1995. The Politics of Priw1tization in Mexico, 13 1.

-APPENDIX 4Telephone Lines per 100 Residents
Western Hemisphere, 1990
Canada
United States
Barbados
Bahamas
Granada
Trinidad & Tobago
Argentina
Costa Rica
Belize
Panama
Suriname
San Vicente
Venezuela
Columbia
Chile
Mexico
Jamaica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador

Cuba~===r---t--~r---t---;---;----r---t--~r---t---t-~

Peru
Paraguay
Bolivia
EI Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Nicaragua
Haiti

-I
-I
-I
-I

I
I

-p
-p
-p
-~

o

10

20

30

40

50

Source: Szekely and del Palacio, 1995. Ttlifonos de Mexico, 42.

60
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-APPENDIX 5-

TELMEX PERFORMANCE VS. SELECT NATIONS

1988-1993
Main
lines/
Per 100
people

Employee
/1,000
mam
lines

Waiting
time for
line
(years)

Main
lines with
failure

Mexico

5.2

10

Argentina

9.6

Brazil

Local call

Long-distance
completion
rate (%)

Days to
repatr a
line

Dial tone in
3 seconds

(%)

completion
rate (%)

2-3

10

92

90

4

97

14

22

45

42

29

14

na

5.5

II

na

5

39

na

2

84

Chile

4.6

8

na -

7

97

93

3

95

Venezuela

7.5

II

8

na

49

31

na

na

Tanzania

0.2

69

II

na

na

na

na

na

India

0.5

96

na

13

na

na

na

na

Indonesia

0.4

50

8

17

na

na

na

na

United States

51

6.6

A few days

>1

na

na

na

na

Japan

40

6.6

A few days

>1

na

na

na

na

Country

Source: Ramamurti. 1996. Telephone privatization in a large country: Mexico, 90.

(%)
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-APPENDIX 6TELMEX PERFORMANCE,

1988-93

"-

Performance Indicator

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Lines in Service
Annual increase (k' s)

288

460

508

670

729

867

% Increase

7

10.5

10.5

12.5

12.1

12.8

Total lines (k' s)

4,387.0

4,847.0

5,355.0

6,025.0

6,754.0

7,621.0

Lines installed
Annual increase (k' s)

345

535

705

759

711

975

% Increase

7.4

10.4

12.4

11.9

9.9

12.4

Total lines (k' s)

5,152

5,687

6,392

7,151

7,862

8,837

Telephone density (per/lOO)

5.6

6.1

6.6

7.2

8

8.7

# Employees

49,995

49,203

49,912

49,488

48 ,937

48,771

Lines per employee

85.5

95.2

104.2

117.7

133 .3

151.5

Capital expenditure ($USm)

1,080.0

987.0

1,831.0

1,967.0

2,352.0

2,282.0

Source: Ramamurti. 1996. Privatization in a large country: Mexico, 90.
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